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Introduction 
‘It is not for Pakistan to decide as to what role another country [India] has in 
regional or global affairs. Pakistan also cannot decide on behalf of an independent and 
sovereign country Afghanistan and dictate them as to how to conduct their foreign 
policy’, said Raveesh Kumar, the Official Spokesperson of India’s Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA) on January 18, 2019, in response to Pakistan’s statement that 
‘India has no role in Afghanistan’.1 Kumar went on to blame Pakistan for supporting 
‘cross-border terrorism’ against its neighbours and sought Islamabad to ‘join 
international efforts to bring inclusive peace to Afghanistan’.2 Reflective of the tense 
triangular geopolitical dynamic between Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi, the 
statement highlighted India’s struggle to ensure its political relevance in the Afghan 
peace process. Despite having invested over US$2 billion in Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction efforts since 2001, India’s official position of supporting an ‘Afghan 
[government]-led, Afghan [government]-owned, and Afghan [government]-
controlled’3 reconciliation process came under severe strain when the United States’ 
decided to hold direct talks with the Pakistan-supported Afghan Taliban since 
1 Government of India (GoI), ‘Official Spokesperson’s response to media query’, 18/01/2019: Link here.  
2 Ibid 
3 GoI, ‘Text of Strategic Partnership Agreement’, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 04/10/2011: Link here. 
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November 2018.4 Held in Doha, the US-Afghan Taliban talks undermine the Afghan 
government that made multiple offers to the Afghan Taliban since 2014 to hold peace 
talks ‘without any preconditions’, only to be rebuffed by the latter.5 In contrast, the 
process strengthened the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Kabul, and 
lent weight to Islamabad’s threat of reducing India’s presence in Afghanistan.     
Why does New Delhi continue to refuse diplomatic engagement with the 
Afghan Taliban and supports a government in Kabul that is hamstrung by internal 
divisions, endemic corruption, and may not survive without financial, political, and 
military support from the US? India’s approach seems perplexing given its intent to 
maintain long-term presence in Afghanistan and to cultivate friendly ties with Kabul. 
The fact that the US and other actors such as China, Russia, and Iran are engaging 
with the Afghan Taliban imparts urgency to this question.6 What makes it important, 
however, are the interconnections between the Afghan conflict and South Asian 
geopolitics. India’s tormented relationship with Pakistan and increasing power 
potential will ensure that whatever position it takes on these issues will have an 
impact on Afghanistan’s future. Nonetheless, what makes this question interesting is 
the fact that India’s relations with the Kabul government itself underwent a shift since 
2014. In early 2018, when Afghan president Ashraf Ghani reached out to the Afghan 
Taliban offering talks without any preconditions, India welcomed the move at the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 ‘Taliban holds talks with US envoy in Qatar’, Al Jazeera, 19/11/2018; Link here. Give some readings on 
Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban (female authors as well).  
5 Government of Afghanistan (GoA), ‘The Kabul Process for Peace & Security Cooperation in Afghanistan 
Declaration’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28/02/2018: Link here. 
6 ‘Russia, U.S., China aim to cajole Taliban into inter-Afghan talks’, Reuters, 24/04/2019, Link here. For a longer 
history of China’s engagement with the Taliban see Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New 
Geopolitics (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015); Andrew Higgins and Mujib Mashal, “In Moscow, Afghan Peace 
Talks Without the Afghan Government”, New York Times, 04/02/2019, link here.   
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with a cautionary note that ‘the Afghan Government’s willingness for peace is despite 
the fact that armed groups have identified themselves and demonstrated to all of us 
that they are the irreconcilables … it should also be clear to the armed opposition that 
there would be no tolerance for those who continue violence’.7 This statement marked 
a subtle but certain departure from India’s previous reaction to a similar outreach by 
Kabul in 2015. At that point in time, Indian officials viewed Ghani’s desire for talks 
as a ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan, antithetical to India’s strategic interests. In response, New 
Delhi cancelled high-level bilateral and multilateral engagements with Kabul.8 
India’s role in Afghanistan has traditionally attracted limited analytical 
attention.9 Often considered to be a peripheral player, Indian presence in Afghanistan 
is often understood in binary terms either as a positive regional power invested in the 
developmental sector, or as a negative regional competitor of Pakistan. Such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Government of India (GoI), ‘The irreconcilable guns in Afghanistan need to be silenced: Statement by 
Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative to the UN’, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), 
08/03/2018: Link here. 
8 Suhasini Haidar, ‘India rebuffs Afghanistan on Strategic Meet’, The Hindu, 29/08/2015: Link here. 
9 For existing survey of India’s Afghanistan policy and larger approach vis-à-vis Central Asia, see Tanvi Pate, 
“Soft Power, Strategic Narratives, and State Identity: Re-assessing India-Afghanistan Relations post-2011” India 
Review, 17 (3), 320-351, 2018; Sanya Saroha, Ashok Behuria, and Yaqoob Ul Hassan, “US-Taliban Talks for 
Afghan Peace: Complexities Galore”, Strategic Analysis, 43 (2), 126-137, 2019; C Christine Fair, “Under the 
Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?” International Affairs, 87 (3), May 2011, 
571-588; Sandra Destradi, “India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan”, The Washington Quarterly, 37 (2), 2014, 
103-117; Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “India’s Evolving Policy Contours towards Post-2014 Afghanistan”, Journal 
of South Asian Development, 82 (5), September 2013, 185-207; Meena Singh Roy, “India’s interests in Central 
Asia’, Strategic Analysis, 12, 2001, 2273-2289; Harsh Pant, “India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a rising 
power”, Contemporary South Asia, 18 (2), 2010, 133-153; Elisabeth Leake, The Defiant Border: The Afghan-
Pakistan Borderlands in the Era of Decolonization, 1936-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); 
Avinash Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy – India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017)  
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narrative overlooks the complexity of India’s relationship with Afghanistan and its 
enduring role in moulding the contours of the Afghan conflict and its importance in 
crafting a future resolution. Unsurprisingly, as the US seeks a negotiated settlement 
with the Afghan Taliban, there is limited clarity about the direction of India’s role 
therein, and much concern about its increasing isolation in Afghanistan.10 To fill this 
gap in literature and to offer an answer to the question raised above, this article 
focuses on India’s contrasting response to Ghani’s outreach to the Afghan Taliban in 
2015 and 2018/19.11 To be sure, the article does not aim to validate, dispute, or 
advance theoretical debates on India’s foreign policymaking.12 Neither does it intend 
to offer a historical overview, or detailed future scenarios, of India’s relationship with 
Afghanistan. The objective is to unpack the source of India’s contrasting responses on 
peace talks between 2015 and 2018, and in doing so, explain the reasons for India’s 
continuous distancing from the Afghan Taliban despite the Trump’s administrations 
direct talks with the group.  
The article argues that India’s core desire is to ensure a strategic balance 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan.13 Given the power differential between Kabul and 
Islamabad, this means that India wants to ensure that Pakistan does not manipulate the 
terms of reconciliation between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul.14 This is because one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Indrani Bagchi, ‘India elbowed out of the Afghanistan peace talks’, Times of India, 15/07/2019; link here. 
11 For analysis on how India dealt with the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s see, Avinash Paliwal, ‘India’s 
Taliban Dilemma – To Contain or to Engage?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40 (1-2), 36-67, 2017  
12 For a primer on that see, Harsh Pant ed. New Directions in India’s Foreign Policy: Theory and Praxis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018)   
13 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 13-17.  
14 The idea of balance here is not insinuating a wider construct that has to do with actual balance of power between 
two countries. It implies Afghan strategies to cope with Pakistani pressure in the face of overwhelming power 
imbalance. Of note here is the aspect that India is not averse to Kabul reconciling with the Afghan Taliban and 
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of the demands Pakistan consistently makes from Kabul in return for cooperation is a 
reduction in Indian diplomatic, intelligence, and developmental presence in 
Afghanistan.15 India’s objective is to ensure that no future dispensation in Kabul 
undermines Indian interests in the country. The aim to maintain such a strategic 
balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan is informed by a combination of two more 
structural drivers. These include changes in other regional and global power’s 
approach towards Afghanistan, the evolving landscape of Afghanistan’s mainstream 
politics, and the balance of power between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul. In 2015, 
lack of clarity about the US’s Afghanistan policy, continuing Afghan Taliban 
offensives, and Ghani’s temporary side-lining of India, raised concerns in New Delhi 
about Kabul’s impending ‘strategic tilt’ towards Islamabad at the cost of Indian 
interests. In contrast, Kabul’s 2018 overture was backed by a commitment by the 
Trump to continue US troop presence on the basis of ‘conditions on the ground – not 
arbitrary timetables’.16 The peace overture itself was made directly to the Afghan 
Taliban and not to Pakistan. Unlike in 2015, Ghani took India into confidence in 2018 
before calling for dialogue ‘without preconditions’, and earned Indian support despite 
the erosion of Kabul’s control over large territorial pockets across the country.17 
India’s desire to limit Pakistan’s scope for manipulating the reconciliation 
process between the Afghan Taliban and the government is central in keeping its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
vice versa i.e. the Afghan Taliban is not the problem per se. Pakistani influence on the Afghan Taliban and the 
latter’s inability to liberate itself from such influence is the problem. Enabling Kabul to devise ways of handling 
and potentially countering Pakistani pressures on the issue of reconciling with the Afghan Taliban (despite the 
overwhelming power imbalance between the two countries) is at the heart of India’s Afghanistan policy.  
15 ‘A Conversation with Shahid Khaqan Abbasi’, Council on Foreign Relations, 20/09/2017: Link here. 
16 United States Government (USG), ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South 
Asia’, The White House, 21/08/2017, link here. 
17 Author’s interview with A, serving Indian intelligence official, New Delhi, 2017 
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policy focussed upon Kabul. This is despite Trump’s decision to open direct talks 
with the Afghan Taliban in 2019. There is a sense in New Delhi that no arrangement 
that favours one entity over the other (i.e. the Afghan Taliban or the Kabul 
government) is likely to succeed.18 In this context, New Delhi views the Afghan 
Taliban as a group that has failed to liberate itself from its dependence on Pakistan, 
and is thus of limited strategic value to India. If anything, opening official channels 
with the Afghan Taliban is likely to increase the group’s international profile and 
strengthen its hand against Kabul. This was apparent in India’s refusal to accept an 
interim government in Kabul as discussed during the US-Afghan Taliban six-day 
talks in Doha in February 2019.19 This article unpacks these empirics in three 
sections. First, it outlines the spectrum of India’s Afghanistan policy debate and the 
drivers of policy change. Here the article borrows Avinash Paliwal’s analytical work 
wherein he demonstrates how some Indian officials (partisans) advocate an aggressive 
anti-Pakistan operational stance, whereas others (conciliators) argue for an 
accommodative approach towards Pakistan-supported groups in Afghanistan. 20 
Second, it details Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan in 2014-15, India’s disapproval of the 
same, and explains the source of India’s opposition. Third, it explains why India 
approved Ghani’s outreach in 2018 after having opposed it in 2015. Based on this 
analysis the conclusion articulates the reason for India’s unceasing support for Kabul.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Harsh V. Pant and Avinash Paliwal, “India’s Afghan Dilemma Is Tougher Than Ever”, Foreign Policy, 
19/02/2019, Link here; Amar Sinha, India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan (2013-2016), ‘Naïve To Think Taliban 
Will Pull The Plug On Other Terror Groups’, Strategic News International, 10/05/2019, Link here. 
19 Devirupa Mitra, “India to US: Not in Favour of ‘Interim’ Government in Afghanistan’, The Wire, 03/02/2019, 
Link here. 
20 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 10-19	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Before we move to the next section it is important to highlight the research 
methodology of this article. Such a disclosure is important given how contemporary 
and sensitive the issue under analysis is. The complexity and uncertainty of the 
Afghan conflict and limited information on the ongoing US talks with the Afghan 
Taliban puts a limit on offering a definitive analysis on India’s engagement with these 
processes. To ameliorate some such concerns, this article utilises the partisans versus 
conciliators theoretical lens that Paliwal offers as a heuristic to explain India’s 
behaviour in Afghanistan since 1979.21 The following section on the spectrum of 
India’s strategy debate and policy drivers fleshes out this framework in context of the 
central question raised in the article. In terms of sources and data gathering, the article 
relies heavily on publicly available official statements (particularly India’s statements 
at the United Nations Security Council – UNSC), existing secondary literature, media 
reports, and a selection of primary interviews with officials who were directly 
responsible for shaping India’s Afghanistan policy in recent years. Whereas some 
interviews were conducted during between 2013 and 2016, others were conducted for 
between 2017 and 2019. To be clear, interview data is problematic, and does not 
match the gold standard of archival material. But the contemporary nature of this 
article makes semi-structured interviews critical, if not definitive. To ensure that the 
information provided in these conversations is correct, I corroborated it with available 
primary and secondary sources, as well as from other interviewees who were privy to 
such information. All interviewees were shortlisted based on prior information about 
their position within the Government of India. Most of these interviews, especially 
those conducted over the last couple of years, were held under pledges of anonymity. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 10-19. This theoretical lens itself is rooted in the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF). For more on ACF see, Paul A Sabatier and Christopher M Wieble eds. Theories of Policy Process 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2014)   
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Where the interviewee was agreeable to reveal identity, their full name and 
designation as well as location and date of the interview is disclosed.  
 
Spectrum of Strategy Debate and Drivers of India’s Afghanistan Policy 
The security situation in Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s role therein makes 
Afghanistan strategically important for India. Given Afghanistan and India’s strained 
ties with Pakistan, bonhomie between Kabul and New Delhi is often understood as 
‘proxy warfare’.22 This dominant narrative implies that India and Pakistan compete 
for influence over different Afghan factions to limit each other’s room for strategic 
manoeuvre in the war-torn country. Operationally, this means that India seeks a 
government in Kabul that will not allow Pakistan’s secret service, the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), to run training camps for India-centric militants, as it did 
throughout the 1990s. An India-friendly government in Kabul may use diplomatic and 
asymmetric warfare tools to exert pressure on Islamabad, just like it did during the 
presidency of Hamid Karzai by supporting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants 
and Baloch separatist leaders.23 In contrast, Pakistan has historically sought strategic 
depth in Afghanistan in order to use Afghan territory during a military crisis with 
India. Today, ensuring a cooperative, if not a compliant, regime in Kabul is viewed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  William Dalrymple, ‘The Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India’, The Brookings Institution, 
25/06/2013; Rudra Chaudhuri, ‘The Proxy Calculus: Kabul, not Kashmir, Holds the Key to Indo-Pakistani 
Relationship’, The RUSI Journal, 22/12/2010, 52-59; Nicholas Howenstein and Sumit Ganguly, ‘India-Pakistan 
Rivalry in Afghanistan’, Journal of International Affairs, University of Columbia, 25/03/2010, Link here; Fair, 
“Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?”, 571-588; D’Souza, “India’s 
Evolving Policy Contours towards Post-2014 Afghanistan”, 185-207 
23 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 239-246  
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critical by Islamabad to obviate strategic encirclement by India.24 In the light of this 
strategic competition, there is consensus among India’s policymaking circles that a 
‘independent, genuinely sovereign, territorially united, and economically strong 
Afghanistan’ is in India’s interest.25 It is assumed that a strong and stable Afghanistan 
will not succumb to Pakistani manipulation of Afghan domestic politics, and is likely 
to counter Pakistan given the historically strained bilateral ties between Kabul and 
Islamabad.  
The debate emerges on what can, and should, India do to achieve this 
objective of a strong and stable Afghanistan. The partisan line of argument is that 
‘India should focus on whoever comes to power in Kabul without fear or favour’.26 
India should thus build goodwill among the people of Afghanistan, and engage with 
every Afghan political unit, including the Afghan Taliban and its various factions. 
This view pervades the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and sections of India’s 
external intelligence agency the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).27 Officials 
who advocate this line appreciate the difficulty of opening and sustaining a 
meaningful channel with Afghan insurgent groups dependent on Pakistan – but they 
advocate such an approach nonetheless. An economically proactive (in terms of aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Khalid H Nadiri, ‘Old Habits, New Consequences: Pakistan’s Posture Towards Afghanistan Since 2001’, 
International Security, 39 (2), 2014; C Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014) 103-135; Ayesha Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy: 
Separating Friends from Enemies”, The Washington Quarterly, 34 (1), 149-162, 2011; Aparna Pande, Explaining 
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (London: Routledge, 2011) 59-87; Tricia Bacon, “Slipping the Leash? 
Pakistan’s Relationship with the Afghan Taliban”, Survival, 60 (5), 159-180, 2018  
25 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 11-12 
26 Ibid, 7-26  
27 Based on a series of interviews conducted by the author in India with serving and retired diplomats and 
intelligence officers between 2014 and 2019.  
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and capacity building) and politically open approach, it is argued, will allow India to 
have close relations with whoever comes to power in Kabul. Advocates of this 
argument prefer to avoid the repeat of the 1996 to 2001 phase when India cut all 
contact with the Taliban and had no embassy in Kabul, despite the latter wanting to 
keep a channel open.  
The conciliatory view calls India to develop strong political, economic, and 
military ties with only those Afghan groups that are at odds with and operate 
independently of Pakistan. This is a dominant view within the armed forces and 
domestic intelligence agencies such as the Intelligence Bureau. Such reasoning also 
resonates among members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the 
powerful National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval.28 These policymakers assert 
that India should actively contain Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan by supporting 
India’s anti-Pakistan Afghan ‘friends’. This can be done by offering such groups 
political, military, and financial support, and by generating international diplomatic 
support at the UN for their cause. For instance, India’s support for the erstwhile 
United Front, popularly known as the Northern Alliance, during the 1990s was shaped 
along such partisan lines. If India’s material support for such anti-Pakistan Afghan 
factions falls short of buttressing the former’s domestic power base, then, India must 
undertake overt or covert military operations to undermine their opponents. The best 
way to make sense of these strategy debates is to view it as a spectrum along which 
foreign policy decisions are discussed.29 It is equally important to note that this debate 
is far from being a binary, is heavily context-dependent, and that identifying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Doval was part of the Indian negotiations team that went to Kandahar in 1999 to secure the release of the 
hijacked Air India flight IC814. See Praveen Donthi, ‘Undercover – Ajit Doval in Theory and Practice’, The 
Caravan, 01/09/2017. Link here. 
29 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 10-13 
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institutions that (broadly) embody the argument enhanced along either line is an 
exercise that risks analytical reductionism. For instance, it is possible that a certain 
policymaker adopts a partisan anti-Pakistan stand at one point in time but navigate to 
a conciliatory stance in other circumstances. 
Which of these ideas translate into policy output depends on the central driver 
of India’s Afghanistan policy i.e. New Delhi’s desire to strike a strategic balance 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This driver is more important than, if not 
unrelated to, India’s own bilateral relations with Pakistan. If Indian policymakers 
perceive that Pakistan is succeeding in, or is likely to succeed in, pressuring 
Afghanistan on the issue of reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban, then the 
likelihood of a partisan anti-Pakistan and anti-Afghan Taliban policy course increases. 
On the other hand, India is likely to adopt a conciliatory approach if its policymakers 
are confident of Afghanistan’s intent and capability to negotiate with the Afghan 
Taliban and Pakistan without compromising on the gains made since 2001 or agreeing 
to reduced Indian presence in the country. As the following sections demonstrate, 
India continues to maintain a Kabul-centric partisan policy course despite the 
resumption of direct talks between the US and the Afghan Taliban. This central driver 
of India’s Afghanistan policy is supplemented by two additional factors; (a) the 
evolving policies of regional and great powers involved in Afghanistan, and (b) 
Afghan domestic politics.30 
If Iranian and Russian support was important for India to sustain financial 
links with its favoured factions in the 1990s, the role of the US and NATO became 
critical to build India’s political and developmental presence across Afghanistan after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 13-14. All these factors are conditioned by India’s changing economic capacities 
and geographical disconnect with Afghanistan. Ibid 
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2001. Equally, within Afghanistan, different political factions have valued India 
varyingly at different points in time, despite the widespread goodwill that India has 
historically enjoyed in Afghan society. Ghani, for example, side-lined India in 2015 to 
address Pakistani concerns.31 Both these factors i.e. postures of regional powers and 
Afghan domestic politics, influence Indian’s policy debates on Afghanistan. After all, 
the question of how to tackle Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban animates 
debates in Kabul, Moscow, Tehran, and Washington DC, as much as it does in New 
Delhi. In such situations, advocates of both the partisan anti-Pakistan strategy and the 
conciliatory strategy find allies and detractors internationally that strengthen or 
weaken their policy views within India.  
Another dimension that this article highlights is the impact of structural 
uncertainty on India’s Afghanistan policy. For most part from 2014 to 2017, it was 
unclear what direction the US will take in Afghanistan i.e. will it withdraw all troops, 
extend its timeline of withdrawal and limit the troop numbers, or continue to fight 
indefinitely and may even increase troop presence? Mismatch between the official 
end of the US-led ISAF operations in December 2014, and continuing US combat 
operations against a resurgent Afghan Taliban for most part of 2015 and 2016, 
imparted uncertainty to the situation. Fissures within the National Unity Government 
(NUG) in Kabul coupled with lack of regional consensus on Afghanistan made 
matters worse. Such uncertainty strengthened India’s anti-Pakistan partisanship in 
rhetoric, while keeping the door open for a conciliatory approach with pro-Pakistan 
Afghan factions in practice. The US’s decision to open direct communications with 
the Afghan Taliban in late-2018 affords clarity of intent from the US, but continues to 
promise uncertainty and prolonged conflict on the ground.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Praveen Swami, ‘Upset with Delay, Kabul shelves request for arms aid from Delhi’, Indian Express, 30/10/2014 
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In such situations, no single policy view enjoys decisive influence over policy 
outcomes. Instead, what occurs is a policy compromise where the government adopts 
an official de jure posture along one or the other line, but de facto practices the 
opposite in order to keep its options open. Such was the case from 2005 to 2011, 
when India officially maintained that there is ‘no good and bad Taliban’, but opened 
secret channels with certain Afghan Taliban factions to gauge their views on relations 
with India – and what they think of India’s presence in Afghanistan.32 Difference 
between policy rhetoric and practice has reflected the polarized debate within India’s 
policymaking circles on the Afghan question, and the rough-and-tumble of a war-torn 
country’s daily politics at moments of particular flux. During moments of transition, 
Indian prime ministers, unable to make clear strategic choices, give room for both 
partisanship and conciliation to flourish until the situation on the ground sufficiently 
clarifies itself. 33  Therefore, essentially, throughout the 2014-2018 period, India 
officially supported Kabul. But given the myriad problems afflicting the Afghan 
government, and the US’ decision to open direct talks with the Afghan Taliban, the 
question of opening a direct channel with the Afghan Taliban remains much debated 
in New Delhi.    
 
Outreach 1.0 
Why did India react negatively to Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan and the 
Afghan Taliban in 2015? This question is important not just to make sense of India’s 
acceptance of a similar outreach in 2018, but also because India officially supports an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Paliwal, My Enemy’s Enemy, 213-245  
33 For insights on how Indian prime minister made some clear foreign policy choices on a select issue such as the 
India-US nuclear deal, the 2009 Sri Lankan civil war, see Shivshankar Menon, Choices: Inside the Making of 
India’s Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2016)  
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Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled reconciliation process since 2011. 
The following paragraphs introduce Ghani’s outreach to the Afghan Taliban and 
Pakistan in 2015, outline India’s reaction thereof, and then examine the reasons for 
India’s reaction.  
 
Ghani’s Outreach  
Soon after taking office in September 2014, the new Afghan president Ashraf 
Ghani spent political capital in reaching out to Pakistan. He was responding to 
Afghanistan’s security woes in the wake of the forthcoming drawdown of US combat 
troops and increasing attacks by the Afghan Taliban.34 His approach was simple i.e. in 
return for persuading the Afghan Taliban to renounce violence and enter negotiations 
with his government, Kabul will deliver on Pakistan’s demands to reduce Indian 
influence in the country, and crackdown on TTP figures operating from Afghan soil. 
US officials believed that only Pakistan could ensure a peaceful ‘exit’ of US troops 
and deliver on reconciliation.35 Despite vehement opposition against such an outreach 
from within and outside the Afghan government, Ghani went ahead.  
He articulated a ‘five-circle foreign policy’ and in a clear signal to Pakistan 
put India in the ‘fourth’ circle – to New Delhi’s disappointment. 36  His first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 AFP ‘Afghan president Ashraf Ghani arrives in Islamabad to build Pakistan ties’, The Guardian, 14/11/2014: 
Link here. 
35 ‘Joint Statement by President Barack Obama and President Ashraf Ghani’, The American Presidency Project, 
24/03/2015, Link here. 
36 “The five circles of Ghani’s foreign policy objectives are: (i) the neighboring countries, (ii) Islamic countries, 
(iii) the West, (iv) Asia and (v) international organizations. Initially, President Ghani’s “neighboring countries” 
definition did not include countries that did not share a boundary with Afghanistan, but that soon changed as it 
raised some eyebrows in India, and possibly Russia, resulting in a U-turn by Ghani to modify the “neighbors”1 
into “neighborhood”2 to include countries with significant clout and importance for Afghanistan, such as India.” 
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international trips were to Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, a further sign of the 
limited importance he attached to India. Furthermore, within a month of taking office, 
in October 2014, he shelved a long-pending proposal of arms aid from India.37 In 
early 2015, in one of the most controversial moves in this process, Afghanistan’s 
intelligence agency, the National Directorate for Security (NDS), signed a 
Memorandum-of-Understanding (MoU) with the ISI without taking its chief 
Rahmatullah Nabil into confidence.38 It was expected that such a MoU would reduce 
tensions between the two intelligence agencies and help pave the way for peace talks. 
Soon after, Ghani met with Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership and agreed to 
allow ISI officers to interrogate imprisoned TTP cadres in order to glean operational 
intelligence in support of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistan’s counter-insurgency 
operation in Waziristan.39  
What made Ghani’s outreach audacious was the fact that throughout this 
period the number of Afghan Taliban attacks increased and resulted in a 28 percent 
hike in casualty figures of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces 
(ANSDF).40 Plus, Ghani had little domestic support for the outreach. Afghan public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Malaiz Daud, ‘Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective”, CIDOB Policy Research 
Project, Norweian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2016, Link here. Suhasini Haidar, ‘In Step With Ghani’s 
Afghanistan’, The Hindu, 24/04/2015, Link here; Vivek Katju, ‘Ghani and India: Circles of Separation’, Gateway 
House India, 29/04/2015, Link here. 
37 Swami, ‘Upset with delay, Kabul shelves request for arms aid from Delhi’, Indian Express. 
38  Mirwais Adeel, ‘Afghan NDS chief opposed signing agreement with Pakistan’s ISI’, Khaama Press, 
18/05/2018, Link here; Jon Boone and S E Rasmussen, ‘Afghan backlash over security deal with Pakistan’, The 
Guardian, 19/05/2015, Link here. For more see Christophe Jaffrelot ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (Ed.), Pakistan at the 
Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) 
39 Interview with ‘A’    
40 Tom Vanden Brook, ‘Afghan casualties surged in 2015 because of increased Taliban attacks’, USA Today, 
04/01/2016: Link here.  
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opinion, especially in urban centers and small towns that witnessed heavy violence, 
remained staunchly against Pakistan, whose soil the Afghan Taliban operates from. 
Moreover, having lived and worked in the US for most of his adult life, Ghani did not 
have local political ‘constituencies’ like other Afghan politicians. He became 
president with the US supporting him over Abdullah Abdullah, a strong candidate 
representing the Tajik lobby, and orchestrating a power and title-sharing arrangement 
through the NUG.41 The biggest push for his outreach was coming from the White 
House, which was keen on ending the war in 2014.  
By August 2015, the outreach was over. The strains created by domestic 
opposition, Ghani’s novelty in Afghan politics, and Pakistan’s continuing support for 
an ever-aggressive Afghan Taliban were too exorbitant. The final blow came in form 
of a news item in July-end that Mullah Omar had been dead since 2013.42 The news 
came in the middle of Pakistan’s facilitation of peace talks between Kabul, the US, 
and the Afghan Taliban, and fed into Afghan concerns about Pakistan’s continuing 
duplicity in the process. The struggle for succession within the Afghan Taliban and 
the ensuing violence led to a breakdown of the outreach.43 On August 07, 2015, Kabul 
experienced a series of uncommonly powerful blasts that killed and injured many.44 
The following morning, Ghani withdrew the peace offer and nearly threatened 
Pakistan with a counter attack: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ‘John Kerry makes surprise visit to Kabul to ease tension over Afghan unity pact’, The Guardian, 09/04/2016, 
Link here.   
42 ‘Mullah Omar: Taliban leader ‘died in Pakistan in 2013’’, BBC News, 29/07/2015: Link here.  
43 Antonio Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, ‘An Interview with Mullah Rasool on Reconciliation between the Taliban 
and the Afghan government’, RUSI Commentary, 16/03/2016: Link here.  
44 Ahmed Shakib and Rod Nordland, ‘Waves of Suicide Attacks Shake Kabul on its Deadliest Day of 2015’, New 
York Times, 07/08/2015: Link here.  
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In the middle of the night, at 1:30 a.m., doomsday descended upon our people. It wasn’t an 
earthquake, it wasn’t a storm, it was human hand … I ask the people and government of Pakistan: If a 
massacre such as the one that occurred in Shah Shaheed had happened in Islamabad and the 
perpetrators had sanctuaries in Afghanistan, had offices and training centres in our major cities, how 
would you react?45  
 
Ghani was angered by Pakistan’s non-cooperation despite having delivered by 
targeting TTP and IS-K (Islamic State-Khorasan Province) elements.46 For its part, 
Pakistan most likely knew of Mullah Omar’s death, but failed to disclose this 
information to Kabul. This issue diminished whatever little trust Ghani had put in 
Pakistan to help facilitate peace talks with the Afghan Taliban, and proved crucial to 
Ghani’s change in strategy on Pakistan.  
 
India’s Reaction  
Initially, New Delhi adopted a wait-and-watch approach and supported the 
gambit. It was keen on not being viewed as an obstructionist power impeding the 
NUG’s initiatives. In January 2015, Indian diplomats were confident that Ghani 
would not compromise on the red-lines of reconciliation i.e. Afghan Taliban would 
need to renounce violence and accept the Afghan constitution in order for any 
meaningful talks to begin.47 Even in April 2015, PM Narendra Modi stated that India 
would walk ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Afghanistan despite increasing concerns 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Mujib Mashal, ‘After Kabul Attack, Afghan Leader Points Finger at Pakistan for Failing to Stop Taliban’, New 
York Times, 10/08/2015: Link here. 
46 Ismail Khan, ‘ISIS Leaders Reportedly Killed in Drone Strikes in Afghanistan’, New York Times, 09/07/2015 
47 Author interview with B, serving MEA official, New Delhi, 2015 
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about Ghani’s unfolding ‘strategic tilt’ towards Pakistan. 48  Indian policymakers 
rationalized Ghani’s overtures to Pakistan, including a ‘temporary’ shelving of arms 
aid from India, as expedient tactical ploys to achieve a breakthrough in peace talks.49  
Despite growing concerns with Ghani’s direction, the event that really set 
alarm bells ringing in New Delhi was the May 2015 MoU signed between the Afghan 
and Pakistani intelligence agencies. It was unusual for two secret agencies at war with 
each other to sign a public memorandum-of-understanding. The document went 
against the geopolitical realities of the region and threatened to undermine the 
strategic balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Slowly but surely, India’s 
position began to evolve along partisan lines. In June 2015, New Delhi subtly 
changed its statement on Afghanistan at the UN, asserting that it will only support a 
‘truly’ Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process.50  
The implication of the statement was clear. New Delhi was losing confidence 
in Ghani’s ability to steer the talks even if it did not think that the balance had 
decisively tilted in Pakistan’s favour. A senior Indian diplomat privy to high-level 
deliberations on Ghani’s outreach warned: ‘If this [outreach] becomes a long-term 
feature, then it will be a problem for India’.51 A consensus emerged in New Delhi to 
communicate India’s own redlines to Ghani. Important among these was protecting its 
economic and strategic interests and not allowing the use of Afghan territory for 
India-centric militants. The other crucial issue was the protection of India’s consular 
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50  GoI, ‘Statement by Asoke Mukherjee in UNSC debate on UNAMA’, MEA, 17/09/2015: Link here; GoI, 
‘Statement by Asoke Mukherjee in UNSC debate on UNAMA’, MEA, 22/06/2015: Link here. 
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and diplomatic presence across the country. In addition to re-opening its embassy in 
Kabul in 2001, India opened consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Mazar-e-
Sharif. Such consular presence allowed India to monitor Pakistan’s activities in 
Afghanistan, and assess whether these would have any direct or indirect impact on 
India’s national security.52 A central part of India’s regional security infrastructure, 
these consulates became a thorn in its relationship with Pakistan as it blamed New 
Delhi supporting anti-Pakistan Baloch and Pashtun militants from these consulates.53  
On May 22, 2015, NSA Ajit Doval voiced India’s apprehensions: ‘What 
Pakistan wanted [from the MoU] was to get an assurance and put pressure on 
Afghanistan, so that they will not allow their territory to be used for any security 
related work by India. That is the crux of it. This is based on a faulty assumption that 
India probably uses Afghan soil or Afghan nationals for its security purposes’.54 In 
August 2015, New Delhi rebuffed Kabul’s request to host a high-level strategic 
partnership committee (SPC) meeting to review and revive the 2011 Strategic 
Partnership Agreement.55 In further disapproval of Ghani’s moves, External Affairs 
Minister Sushma Swaraj refused to attend the Sixth Regional Economic Cooperation 
Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) scheduled for September 2015. These 
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developments firmly demonstrated the increasing salience of partisanship over a 
largely tolerant approach till then.  
 
Explaining India’s Reaction to the Peace Talks in 2015 
There were three key reasons why India reacted the way it did. One, it 
perceived that Ghani’s outreach risked undermining the central driver of India’s 
Afghanistan Policy i.e. ensuring a balance between Kabul and Islamabad. Despite 
regular briefings by Afghan officials about their benign intent behind the outreach, 
New Delhi lost confidence in Ghani’s capability to steer the reconciliation process. 
Two, complementing this central concern was the other driver India’s Afghanistan 
policy i.e. evolving approach of regional and great powers towards Afghanistan. The 
impending withdrawal of the US-led NATO troops in the wake of Afghan Taliban 
offensives ran the risk of the latter overwhelming the fledgling Afghan state, and, in 
turn, jeopardizing India’s presence across the country. Finally, the third driver of 
India’s Afghanistan policy i.e. domestic political situation in Kabul, itself remained 
uncertain. Few Afghans supported Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan. Under pressure from 
the US, he had taken a radical step without prior groundwork within Afghan society. 
These inter-locking factors ensured that conciliatory advocacy in India vis-à-vis the 
Afghan Taliban remained marginal. The following paragraphs unpack these three 
inter-locking factors.      
To assess whether Kabul is tilting towards Islamabad, Indian policymakers 
focus, first and foremost, on the temperament of the Afghan president. If this 
individual is willing to make compromises during negotiations with Pakistan (and 
Afghan Taliban) that are either operationally excessive (permitting Pakistani security 
officials access to Afghan prisons for interrogating targets) or go beyond what section 
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of the Afghan society (especially those who benefitted from the support afforded by 
the West) would accept, it raises concerns in New Delhi. Such indicators are 
interpreted as Kabul succumbing to Pakistani pressure and the beginning of a process 
that may lead to a reduced Indian footprint in Afghanistan.56 Though Ghani’s shelving 
of Indian arms aid, and visits to China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan were necessary for 
India to react negatively, what gave sufficiency to the move was the NDS-ISI MoU, a 
core feature of which was reduced Indian presence in Afghanistan.  To be clear, the 
outreach was not a singular crisis moment pushing India to initiate policy shift in a 
short temporal window (e.g. like in 1992 when the Mujahideen came to power by 
ousting former president Mohammad Najibullah).57 It certainly did not create an 
either-or choice. But, had Pakistan reacted constructively to Ghani’s overture and 
delivered on reconciliation in return for reduced Indian presence in Afghanistan, it 
would have intensified the debate between partisans and conciliators.  
Supplementing India’s reading of Ghani’s intent behind the outreach were 
changes in policy approach of key powers involved in Afghanistan. For starters, the 
withdrawal of the US-led NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
December 2014 exacerbated structural dilemmas.58 Few knew what the US would do 
if the Afghan Taliban made inroads soon after the departure of ISAF troops. The fact 
that the ANSF remains incapable of defending the country without external support 
added urgency. As the Afghan Taliban intensified attacks, Kabul and New Delhi 
dreaded a repeat of 1992 when President Najibullah was ousted from power and 
brutally murdered in 1996 by the Taliban. Even Ghani’s signing of the US-
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Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement in October 2014 failed to address Indian 
and domestic Afghan concerns.59   
Parallel to this structural uncertainty emerging from US’ incoherent policy, 
were China’s efforts to mediate between the Afghan Taliban and Kabul (via 
Pakistan). Beijing viewed the Afghan situation as an opportunity to play a role in 
stabilizing the region and use the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (where the US 
vouches for Afghan actions, and China for Pakistan) as a platform to build its 
reputation as a responsible global power. The first official tour Ghani undertook in 
end-October 2014 was to Beijing, and peace talks were high on the agenda.60 Kabul 
wanted China to use its influence in Pakistan to take the peace process forward. 
Before the end of the year, Chinese officials initiated contact with certain Afghan 
Taliban figures in Pakistan and elsewhere. In the light of the horrendous attack by the 
TTP on the Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16, 2014, there was hope 
in Kabul that Islamabad might change tack.61  
India had intelligence about the outreach. However, in March 2015, 
Afghanistan’s CEO Abdullah Abdullah formally informed India that China held ‘one, 
two, or three’ rounds of talks with the Afghan Taliban, and asked the latter ‘to have 
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talks directly with the Afghan government’.62 On May 19-20 2015, senior Afghan 
official Mohammad Masoom Stanikzai held a secret meeting with Afghan Taliban 
representatives in Urumqi, under the supervision of China and Pakistan.63 Though no 
breakthrough occurred in or after the meeting, China’s increasing role in Afghan 
politics cautioned India.64 New Delhi’s relations with Beijing had turned sour by early 
2015, and the two countries’ previous backchannel on Afghanistan had become 
redundant.65 Both Beijing and New Delhi had an interest in stabilizing Afghanistan, 
but difference lay in how to reach that end-point. Allowing Pakistan to influence 
Afghan affairs was not a problem for China the way it was for India (an aspect 
Afghan officials realized after Beijing’s 2015 attempts to facilitate peace talks). 
Pakistan’s strategic importance for China convinced Indian officials that Beijing was 
likely to support Pakistan over Afghanistan during crunch negotiations when an 
‘either-or’ choice was to be made i.e. China was unlikely to press Pakistan into giving 
up its support for the Haqqanis, or coaxing the Afghan Taliban to talk to the Afghan 
government, if Islamabad did not see value in it.66  
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In addition, domestic Afghan politics increased India’s skepticism about the 
outreach. Ghani’s actions were criticized domestically. Former president Karzai, who 
had developed close links with India during his tenure, warned that the outreach 
risked sliding Afghanistan ‘under [the] thumb’ of Pakistan.67 Many Afghans viewed it 
as Ghani’s attempt to cater to the US’s unreasonable demands. The opposition viewed 
him as an American presidential appointee without a mass base and running a 
government of Western-educated technocrats.68 This scenario veered from the Karzai 
years where one individual took most decisions. As India’s former National Security 
Advisor M K Narayanan put it, Karzai was a ‘maximum leader’ close to India.69 In 
contrast, Ghani was presiding over a structurally weak, operationally inadequate, and 
politically divided apparatus. To make matters worse, his reputation of being short-
tempered and inability to build domestic consensus isolated Ghani further within the 
government. In this context, his outreach to Pakistan in general, and the NDS-ISI 
MoU in particular, enraged Afghanistan’s intelligence community. 70  Allegedly 
coerced into signing the MoU, NDS officers blamed NSA Hanif Atmar for being the 
architect of the deal. The Afghan parliament demanded a text of the same and 
threatened to invalidate it. Fierce domestic opposition heightened India’s 
apprehensions about the deal and convinced New Delhi to criticise the move.   
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The failure of outreach 1.0 helped stabilise India-Afghanistan relations, and 
led to increased communication between New Delhi and Kabul. Three years later, in 
February 2018, Ghani made another peace offer without preconditions.71 It was made 
directly to the Afghan Taliban, and not via Pakistan. Critically, the offer came within 
weeks of the Afghan Taliban’s open letter seeking direct dialogue with the US.72 It 
was meant to demonstrate that the insurgents could only seek peace with Kabul, not 
directly with the US. For long, the Afghan Taliban has been refusing to negotiate with 
the Kabul government, terming it ‘illegitimate’.73 The Afghan Taliban rejected the 
offer, and instead, launched a series of offensives across Afghanistan. The only 
moment when both sides declared unilateral ceasefires was during Eid in June 2018.74 
The ceasefire demonstrated that far from being a move towards mutually acceptable 
peace process, it was part of the competition between Kabul and the insurgents.75 
Nonetheless, India supported the outreach. If Akbaruddin’s March 2018 UN 
statement demonstrated India’s conciliatory stand vis-à-vis Ghani’s outreach, his 
September 2018 statement reinforced it: ‘The challenges posed by the deteriorating 
situation [in Afghanistan] does not mean we [the UNSC] ought to stoically accept the 
death tolls as commonplace. Rather, it should mean that it is time for us to strengthen 
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our collective support for the Government and people of Afghanistan and the brave 
Afghan National Defence and Security Forces to counter the inhumanity of those who 
have banded together to ruthlessly brutalise the lives of the ordinary people of 
Afghanistan’.76  
 
Explaining India’s Reaction to the Peace Talks in 2018 
Making sense of India’s reaction in 2018 requires focus on how changes in 
regional and great power politics, and Afghanistan’s domestic security and political 
situation, impacts India’s options in the light of its desire to strike a balance between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. As mentioned previously, New Delhi pays attention to the 
temperament and actions of the Afghan president vis-à-vis Pakistan. Breakdown of 
the 2015 Afghan outreach to Pakistan, and the Shah Shaheed bombing, made Ghani a 
virulent critic of Pakistan. By October 2015, he elevated India to the first circle of his 
‘five-circle’ foreign policy, and in November, indicating a clear shift in position, 
directed NSA Hanif Atmar to visit New Delhi and finalize the ‘gift’ of four Mi-25 
attack helicopters that had been shelved.77 Though of limited military-strategic value, 
the helicopters sent a powerful signal to the region on India’s position on 
Afghanistan. Between 2015 and 2018, Ghani grew more critical of Pakistan, even 
though he remained politically weak, was unable not quell the insurgency, nor run a 
stable government.  
In 2019, at the time of writing, he continues to face a serious standoff with the 
powerful governor of Balkh, Atta Mohammad Noor, and his vice president Abdul 
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Rashid Dostum.78 Such political instability, and Ghani’s weak popularity is coupled 
with the Afghan Taliban’s offensives, especially in Ghazni and Faryab in August 
2018. The Afghan Taliban threatens nearly 70 percent of Afghanistan’s territory and 
exerts influence on nearly 50 percent population.79 Though these offensives fail to 
win the insurgents control over provincial capitals, they inflict heavy casualties on 
civilians and the Afghan armed forces.80 Such power asymmetry between the Afghan 
Taliban and Kabul makes India’s Kabul-centric policy puzzling. Arguably, these facts 
and the structural uncertainties associated with the Trump administration should lead 
India to reconsider its partisan approach and open a channel to the Afghan Taliban, 
just like it did in the late-2010s, and similar to what Russia and Iran have done.81 But 
it continues to support Kabul nonetheless.  
In addition to the change in Ghani’s position vis-à-vis Pakistan, what then 
explains India’s policy shift in 2018 – before the US decided to open direct talks with 
the Afghan Taliban later that year – is its perception of the US’ policy at that point in 
time. Trump’s decision to support continuous presence of US combat troops in 
Afghanistan offered a temporary but welcome reprieve to Indian policymakers. Heavy 
drone and airstrikes accompanied Trump’s August 2017 speech on South Asia and 
Afghanistan (261 airstrikes between June and November 2017) and joint US-Afghan 
combat operations across Afghanistan (2,175 ground operations, even though US 
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troops did not enter Pakistan’s territory).82 Most regional powers viewed Afghan 
Taliban’s open letter to the US in February 2018 as a reaction to such military 
pressure.83 To be clear, appreciative of the role that US troops were playing, president 
Barack Obama announced in October 2015 that he would maintain the posture of 
9,800 troops throughout 2016 and leave future decision-making in hands of the next 
president.84 The difference between Obama and Trump was that the latter was 
pursuing the same COIN strategy without a fixed timeline until late 2018. Despite its 
transitory nature, the fact that Trump signalled that the US was willing to continue 
fighting until their demands on reconciliation are met resonated well in India’s power 
corridors. India had been making this argument for years, and found an American 
president who finally operationalized it.   
In fact, ever since Trump came to power and announced a strategic review of 
the Afghanistan policy, India activated behind-the-scenes lobbying to shape the US’ 
policy approach. In this, it found a willing partner in the former US NSA General H. 
R. McMaster. Firm in his belief of not withdrawing troops from Afghanistan 
prematurely, McMaster deftly steered the strategic review and generated sufficient 
support within Trump’s embattled administration to continue fighting the war. 85 India 
asserted that talking to the Afghan Taliban would not solve the problem till such talks 
were being micro-managed by the ISI. Despite differences over how they should deal 
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with Pakistan in the long term, there was convergence between the US and India on 
Afghanistan until mid-2018.  
Trump’s August 2017 speech exacerbated India-Pakistan rivalry in 
Afghanistan. Within weeks, Pakistan’s then PM Shahid Khaqan Abbasi countered 
that he saw ‘zero’ political or military role for India in Afghanistan, and that increased 
Indian involvement will further complicate the situation.86 A week after Abbasi’s 
statement, India’s defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman ruled out any Indian ‘boots 
on the ground’ but restated India’s commitment to Afghanistan in all other sectors.87 
Throughout 2018, Indian officials within the MEA and the R&AW were confident 
that Ghani’s outreach that year put Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban under pressure. It 
promised to create confusion (if not dissension) among the Afghan Taliban’s rank and 
file on how to respond, thus increasing cleavages within the movement.88 Even the 
August 2018 offensives in Ghazni and Faryab did not shake India’s confidence in 
Ghani’s ability to steer the reconciliation process without crossing India’s ‘red-lines’.  
 
Conclusion  
The interconnection between the Afghan conflict and India-Pakistan bilateral 
relations makes New Delhi an important stakeholder in Afghanistan’s peace process. 
As this article shows, India desires a strategic balance between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. The fluid nature of Afghan domestic politics with its constantly shifting 
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alliances, however, shapes India’s tactical and operational decision-making in real-
time. On the ground this means striving for a process wherein Kabul does not play a 
weak hand vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban and Islamabad, in light of its military 
setbacks at the hands of the former, and power asymmetry vis-à-vis the latter. Since 
2001, New Delhi has offered over US$2 billion aid package to Kabul, trained many 
Afghan police, military, and intelligence officers, steadfastly (though limitedly) 
supported both Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and earned the image of a trusted 
though reluctant actor in Afghanistan.89 What is less appreciated within this context is 
India’s capability to either advertently or inadvertently complicate Afghanistan’s 
reconciliation process. Historically, India’s support to the Northern Alliance (or the 
United Front) against the Taliban and Pakistan during the 1990s was the height of its 
partisan politics in Afghanistan. Officially it adopted a de jure policy line of bringing 
all warring factions to the negotiations table, but de facto it supported the staunchly 
anti-Taliban and anti-Pakistan Northern Alliance.90 If in 2015, for instance, Pakistan 
would have responded positively to Ghani’s overtures in return for reduced Indian 
presence in Afghanistan, it is likely that New Delhi would have supported Ghani’s 
domestic opponents to undermine such an outreach.91 This is because even though an 
unstable Afghanistan in not in India’s interest, New Delhi fears that stability on 
Pakistan’s term is more harmful to Indian interests.  
It is for this reason that India continues to support the Kabul government in 
2019 despite the US’s decision to open direct talks with the Afghan Taliban. In 
addition to India’s mistrust of Pakistan, policymakers in New Delhi believe that any 
peace process that fails to respect the multiple social and political realities of post-
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2001 Afghanistan is likely to fail.92 Diplomatic recognition and engagement with the 
Afghan Taliban, then, is viewed as an incorrect approach for India (even though there 
is increased acceptance to maintain intelligence links with the Afghan Taliban unlike 
the total disconnect of the 1990s).93 This is because India’s diplomatic outreach to the 
Afghan Taliban will weaken Kabul’s position vis-à-vis the former. It will risk 
dislocating Afghanistan’s political canvass from a constitutional Islamic Republic to 
an Islamic Emirate as envisioned by the Afghan Taliban. India’s limited capacities 
and capabilities to ensure a strategic balance between Afghanistan and Pakistan on an 
on-going basis means that it adopts a multilateral strategy and seeks regional and 
global powers to support Kabul economically, politically, and militarily. This is 
visible in India’s continuing call for an inclusive peace process at the UNSC in June 
2019 where it officially welcomed the ‘opportunities created by recent international 
efforts [in Afghanistan]’.94 New Delhi also gifted of two Mi-24 helicopter gunships to 
Kabul in May 2019, and continues to emphasize on connectivity with Afghanistan 
and Central Asia via Iran where it is developing the Chabahar port.95  
From a partisan-conciliators lens, as laid out at the beginning of this article, 
this means that India’s Afghanistan policy today is somewhere in between i.e. New 
Delhi accepts and supports the reality of Kabul’s outreach to the Afghan Taliban (a 
conciliatory trait), but wants to make sure that Kabul retains some leverage over this 
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process and thus refuses to open official channels of communication with the Afghan 
Taliban (a partisan trait). This aspect is demonstrated best in India’s recent decision to 
abrogate Article 370 of the Constitution of India that afforded special status to the 
now erstwhile contested state of Jammu and Kashmir on August 05, 2019. 
Furthermore, it divided the state into two Union Territories (that are directly 
administered by the central government from New Delhi) of ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ 
and ‘Ladakh’. Such integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union nullified any future 
possibility of negotiations on the issue between India and Pakistan, and American 
arbitration on the same as suggested, twice, by the US president Donald Trump.96 
Despite being part of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) ideological 
fabric and in its election manifestos since 2014, the timing of abrogating Article 370 
was determined by events in and around Afghanistan and increasing bonhomie 
between the Trump administration that depends on Pakistan army’s support for a deal 
with the Afghan Taliban.97 Interestingly, India’s aggressive move in Kashmir has 
been accompanied by conciliatory calls for establishing direct communication with 
the Afghan Taliban by retired but influential officials.98 India’s serving army chief 
made a similar statement in January 2019 indicating an increasing appetite within the 
government to engage with the Afghan Taliban.99 
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The difference in India’s reaction to Kabul’s outreach efforts in 2015 and 
2018/19 has its source in these above-mentioned structural and ideational factors. In 
2015, Indian policymakers, regardless of their institutional background, bureaucratic 
and political positioning, and operational outlook on dealing with pro-Pakistan 
Afghan factions such as the Afghan Taliban, reached a consensus that Ghani’s 
outreach – if successful – would harm India’s strategic interests in the region. Ghani’s 
acquiescence to Pakistani demands, including a reduction in Indian footprint in 
Afghanistan, coupled with lack of reciprocity from Islamabad, threatened the strategic 
balance India sought between its two neighbours. In 2018, however, despite Ghani’s 
domestic political challenges, India viewed the outreach to the Afghan Taliban as one 
that sought to secure Kabul and New Delhi’s interests. It was also supported by 
Trump’s decision to continue financial and military support to Kabul in 2017 as part 
of his new South Asia policy.100 The US’s outreach to the Afghan Taliban ever since 
has raised the spectre that Indian interests may become compromised if Trump allows 
Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban to set the terms of reconciliation.101 Though India 
continues to support Kabul, how it will react to a full withdrawal of US troops with an 
empowered Afghan Taliban in control of parts or whole of Afghanistan depends on 
how isolated India becomes, and whether it perceives the strategic balance shifting 
firmly in Pakistan’s favour or not. Ultimately, the precariousness of India’s position 
to support Kabul in 2019 demonstrates its dependence on external powers to realise a 
balance between Kabul and Islamabad, and its inability to unilaterally shape its 
regional security environment. This is visible in how the chaos within the Trump 
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administration since the exit of McMaster, who shaped Trump’s South Asia strategy 
in 2017, complicated India’s position in Afghanistan.102  
From a regional geopolitical perspective, Russia, China, and Iran’s decision to 
engage with the Afghan Taliban and promote the peace process only heightens the 
risk of India’s isolation in Afghanistan. In an attempt to ensure its continued 
relevance in the Afghan peace process, New Delhi sent senior retired diplomats to 
Moscow in March 2018 for an official conference on Afghanistan that included 
representatives from the Afghan Taliban.103 Despite signalling India’s intention to 
maintain informal lines of communication with the Afghan Taliban, the move did not 
lead to a shift in official policy. This is because Indian policymakers do not view 
China and Russia’s involvement in the peace process as being a dealmaker or deal-
breaker in the immediate term.104 Nonetheless what may undermine further, if not 
unhinge entirely, India’s government-centric Afghanistan policy are the on-going US-
Iran tensions.105 The lack of movement on Chabahar port,106 and India’s recent 
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decision to cut its oil supplies from Iran under US pressure, will negatively affect 
India’s ability to foster connectivity with Afghanistan while bypassing Pakistan.107 
Disconnect with Iran will also preclude the option of India’s sustained support to anti-
Afghan Taliban and anti-Pakistan groups even if its presence in Afghanistan is 
threatened in the future. The lack of geographical contiguity with Afghanistan 
requires India to have a land-based link via Iran. Such a link was required even in the 
1990s, when India’s support for the Northern Alliance was made possible by 
alignment with Russia and Iran. 108  Managing this process of the US seeking 
withdrawal from Afghanistan while threatening the use of force against Iran will be 
one of the key foreign policy challenges for the Narendra Modi 2.0 government.109    
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